As I have shown from prior documentary evidence, the Islamic State's Diwan al-Rikaz is a department of bureaucracy concerned with 'precious resources' primarily of two types: fossil fuels and antiquities. For instance, the Diwan al-Rikaz deals with crude oil purchase receipts, the leasing of gasoline stations, distributions of gas fuel for locals and permission slips for the excavation of (non-idolatrous) artifacts, which are then usually sold off on the black market. Below is Mosul-based Omar Fawaz's account of the Diwan al-Rikaz. Perhaps the most important observation to draw here is the Islamic State's co-optation of existing factories and production facilities for a variety of products (not just oil and gas, but also e.g. soft drinks, cement and plastic) under the Diwan al-Rikaz, likely on the same pattern as the Diwan al-Khidamat's co-optation of services offices whereby employees are compelled to return to work under threat of confiscation of homes. Indeed, the production of ice in factories (mentioned below) has been advertised elsewhere in official Islamic State propaganda, without mention of the Diwan al-Rikaz.
Below is the account translated by me.
#Land of the Caliphate
Al-Rikaz is all that God has planted in the earth from metals, treasures and rocks. As for Diwan al-Rikaz in the Islamic State, the issue has been broadened to cover three divisions: oil resources, metal resources and vehicles. And it has been made to cover all production and manufacturing facilities present in the land of the Caliphate, whether from the path of transportation or oversight.
Since I have dedicated my time to bring the truth to you, God blessed me to meet with one of the officials in the Diwan al-Rikaz of the Mosul area, and he spoke to me about the Diwan's accomplishments. I will outline some of them for you in the points below:
1. After the Diwan's operation for 10 months it has managed to cover the expenditures and needs of the state such that also with thanks to God it has brought the state to 60% complete self-sufficiency, and this ratio may be considered surprising for all [typo: should be likul and not lakin in original Arabic] those interested in the economic aspect, for this young state has been able to attain what the Safavid government could not attain during 11 years.
2. Operating a number of vital factories of which the most important are: Ocean factory for making bottles of water, carbonated drinks and juices (al-Basha formerly), textile factory, a number of ice factories (molds and cubes), plastics factory (cylinders/pipes and tubes), a factory to produce cars' oil, mid-size factories to refine oil (to avoid Crusader bombing).
Cola products from al-Basha, a Mosul-based drinks company. Compare the takeover and renaming with the reopened al-Waritheen hotel in Mosul.
3. Reopening of the public company for domestic furniture, which helps the Muslim populaces (especially those about to get married) through the selling of furniture in competitive allotments and prices.
4. Operating the Badush cement factory at mid-power to meet the needs of the Muslim populaces and service diwans of the Islamic State for cement. On average 1200 tons are produced daily, with one ton costing $100.
5. Similarly the Diwan al-Rikaz is entrusted with transportation for selling and buying oil products (gasoline, kerosene and gas) inside the land of the Caliphate, and even dealing outside the land of the Caliphate, in addition to oversight of and inspecting owners of fuel stations, especially mobile stations, which the Diwan is determined to get rid of, limiting circulation of fuel to official stations (government and civil).
6. The aim of opening the Diwan for production facilities, companies and factories is to provide employment opportunities for Muslim youth and to support the Islamic State materially from the earth's resources just as manufacturing and economic activity are among the most important reasons for victory over foreign hegemony.