Anti-Iranian sentiment has manifested itself in multiple ways during the recent rounds of Iraqi protests. Besides the appearance of anti-Iranian slogans that have repeatedly turned up, the protests have featured more extensive and open violence against Iranian assets and interests than in past demonstrations and unrest. In multiple governorates, protesters have burned bases of Iranian-supported factions within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) such as 'Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the Badr Organization, and Harakat al-Abdal. Even more notably, demonstrators in the holy city of Karbala attacked the Iranian Consulate.
Unsurprisingly, many of those in the Iranian-backed elements of the PMF have hinted at some sort of conspiracy behind the protests. Those PMF factions may have enjoyed a boost in legitimacy as part of the wider PMF phenomenon when the Islamic State was seen as an existential threat. However, the recession of that threat has made all the more apparent their failure to deliver improvements in the daily lives of citizens, such as job prospects and basic services.
These events are a reminder that anti-Iranian sentiment crosses sectarian divides in Iraq rather than just being the preserve of the country's Sunnis. However, it would be a mistake to view anti-Iranian sentiment as running so deep that the current protests constitute a "revolt against Iran." Instead, it is more accurate to characterize the protests as a wholesale rejection of the post-2003 order. Since Iran and its clients in Iraq (among others) have managed to exploit this order for their own benefit at the expense of the wider population, it is unsurprising that the anger is partly taken out on them.