Roel Meijer
Salafism and the Challenge of Modern Politics
A Comparison between ISIS and the Al-Nour Party
I. Introduction
This essay will deal with two issues, the first of
which is the political dimension of Salafism.
One of the main questions concerning Islam
is its political dimension. To what extent is
Islam political and how should we define political? The usual argument is that Islam does
not recognise the difference between politics
and religion. In the Failure of Political Islam
Oliver Roy rejects political Islam’s claims to
provide political solutions.1 The brief definition
of politics I will adopt here is to solve problems
by means of reaching consensus peacefully
with one’s opponents.2 This view of politics allows little room for religion, for religion is
based on normative rules, exclusion, and the
salvation of a specific chosen group, not on
solving complex political issues. As Nathan
Brown, Amr Hamzawy and Marina Ottaway
remarked politics is based on a certain sense
of relativity, while religion is based on absolute
values,3 excluding processes such as political
learning, which is usually seen as a way towards greater openness, moderation, and acceptance of pluralism.4
One way to resolve this problem is make religious political parties more independent from
their movements, allowing the movements or
religious institutions to uphold their absolute
values and allowing political parties to base
their programs on vague, abstract religious
norms that provide enough room to make
compromises.5 With Salafism the problem of
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
16
politics is especially tricky, because its quietist
current – according to Quintan Wiktorowicz’
typology still the largest category of Salafism
– rejects not only overt political participation,
leaving it to the worldly powers, but also gives
politics little thought.6 As long as the ruler is a
Muslim, competent, upholds the sharia, defends the lands of Islam (dār al-islām), and
allows proselytization (daʿwa), political interference is limited to discrete advice (naṣīḥa)
by recognised scholars (ʿulamā’) and his
power is unlimited. The main purpose of life
is to live according to the rules of the sharia
and the purpose of Salafi daʿwa is to purify Islamic doctrine and practice. Its second largest
current, political Salafism, emerged after
members of the Muslim Brotherhood migrated
to Saudi Arabia in the 1950’s and a mixture of
Brotherhood ideology and Salafism created
the “politico” Salafism.7 For the first time, a
modern politics took shape in the sense that
political measures, structures, and rulers were
subjected to critique based on criteria of the
“common good” as opposed to the interests
of the ruling elite and special interests. Corruption was condemned not because it was
against Islamic injunctions, but because it undermined the trust between citizens and state.
The third current, Jihadi Salafism, is usually
considered to be political, but this is not true
according to the definition used above. Jihad
against the ruler according to Jihadi Salafis is
allowed only when he becomes an “unbeliever”, not because he is unjust. Although the
two can go together – the ruler becomes des-
Roy, The Failure of Political Islam 1994.
Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 1993, 6.
Brown, Hamzawy and Ottaway, Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process in the Arab World:
Exploring the Grey Zones, 2006.
Wickham, Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt’s Wasat Party, 2004.
Wegner, Islamist Moderation without Democratization: The Coming of Age of the Moroccan Party of Justice
and Development?, 2009; Brown, Hamzawy and Ottaway, Islamist Movements, 2006.
For the relation between Salafism and politics, see also Meijer, Introduction, 2009.
For the classic analysis of the division of these categories, see Wiktorowicz, Anatomy of the Salafist Movement,
2006.
ORIENT II/ 2016
Salafism and the Challenge of Modern Politics
pot (ṭāghūt) because he is unjust – politics
and religion are confused because opponents
are condemned on religious rather than political grounds.
The killings in Paris, for instance, were not
justified on the grounds of discrimination, the
French principle of laïcité, or even the bombings in Syria, all of which are political arguments. The main reason was that French nonMuslims were “unbelievers” (kuffār, sing.
kāfir). It is especially the complex and ambiguous relationship between politics and religion that makes Salafism so difficult to understand. This becomes even harder when it
adopts a modern totalitarian ideological vision,8 claiming a truth that completely rejects
the existence of politics as a separate field
where religious doctrines are held at bay and
concessions can be made on pragmatic
grounds. Religion in this case trumps politics.
It is this totalitarian temptation that makes
Salafism so attractive to European youth.
Their anger, frustration, search for recognition
and claims to superiority are resolved in the
utopian dream of the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria (ISIS). In this capacity ISIS represents
the supreme paradox: While it claims to be
the ultimate religious, it has become the absolute political in its consequences. Its origins
are traceable not so much to Islam itself but to
the dire circumstances in which ISIS was
born. like other totalitarian denials of politics
such as leninism and Nazism, which
emerged from the destruction of the First
World War, ISIS sprang from the womb of the
Syrian and Iraqi conflagration and Sunni humiliation.
The other issue is that of modernity. Salafism
claims to represent the most authentic version
of Islam, standing the closest to the origins of
Islam as the most “orthodox”. This reading is
followed by most researchers who often start
their research by tracing the doctrine of
Salafism to “the pious forefathers” (al-salaf al-
8
9
sāliḥ). The same occurs with ISIS. Comparisons are made with Islamic law and the earlier Islamic states and how the concepts and
practices of ISIS are based on the examples
of medieval forerunners.9 The introduction of
commanding good and forbidding evil (al-amr
wal-maʿrūf wa-l-nahī ʿan al-munkar, also
called ḥisba) and loyalty to Muslims and disavowal of non-Muslims (al-walā’ wa-l-barā’)
as well as maẓālim and sharia courts seems
to support ISIS’ claims to authenticity. likewise, its use of such terms as subjects
(raʿaya), iniquity (ẓulm), and accountability
(musā’ala) are indications of its close following of the Sharia. But here the claim to authenticity suffers from the same paradox as its
denial of the political: ISIS’ claims to the ultimate authentic become those to the absolute
modern.
This essay will argue that Salafism when it
emerges as a political movement has great
difficulty in coming up with a political terminology simply because there is very little political theory in Islam. Turning original Islamic
concepts, precepts, and practices into modern means of political control changes their
character fundamentally. The Al-Nour Party in
Egypt is confronted with the same problem
but has chosen a completely different path to
solve it. Rather than pulling “orthodox” concepts into the forefront and giving them a
modern meaning, it has adopted the modern
political discourse of rights, which to a large
degree is alien to Salafism. Both ISIS and the
Al-Nour Party are modern because they derive from modern circumstances and therefore try to find modern answers to modern political problems, especially in the relations
among citizens and between citizens and the
state. The Al-Nour Party emerged in the wake
of the Arab Uprisings and was forced to become a modern party and speak the language
of political parties in a constitutional setting;
ISIS emerged after the collapse of the Iraqi
and Syrian Ba‘ath regimes and had to build a
lauzière, The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century, 2016, 121, 164, and especially 201;
Haykal, On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action, 2009, 47.
March and Revkin, Caliphate of Law: ISIS’ Ground Rules, 2015.
ORIENT II/ 2016
17
Roel Meijer
modern state on the ruins of pan-Arabism, an
endeavour that has really very little to do with
the ancient caliphate of Abbasids. The problem they both face, ISIS more than Al-Nour
Party, is that they are hampered by their lack
of modern political terminology and concepts.
They are faced with the option to turn
Salafism into a political ideology or adopt a
democratic notion of politics. Neither sits well
with the Salafism as a religious doctrine.
II. ISIS: Classic terminology for a modern
state
Since ISIS was proclaimed in 2014 much information has been gathered on its strategies,
politics, ideology, and structure. Its rise has
been all the more fascinating as for the first
time in modern history a caliphate is being
erected before our very eyes. However, is this
an Islamic caliphate based on Islamic law or is
it a modern state based on the most modern
means of control, surveillance, and mobilisation? Pre-modern empires had little control
over their populations, who were incorporated
into its boundaries with the retention of their
own laws, local customs, ethnic identity, hierarchies, languages and religions. Not for nothing has the Ottoman Empire been called the
“empire of difference”.10 Only in its modern
successor states, which were nation-states,
did the state really become powerful enough
to impose a unity of language, religion, ethnicity, and ideological mobilisation. These attempts were not always successful, but not for
lack of trying. The Iraqi Ba’ath regime, described by Kanan Makiya as the “republic of
fear”,11 was notorious for its attempts to impose a unified Sunni state that discriminated
against Shi‘is and Kurds. It has been called
Stalinist for its attempt to acquire total control
over its population and instil terror. In the
1980’s and 1990’s, the centralised regime collapsed and degenerated into a patrimonial
regime based on cooptation, patronage, and
clientelism.
ISIS is in its totalitarian claims a true successor to the Ba’ath regime and it is no coincidence that some of its leaders are
Ba’athists.12 The Islamic terminology resembles more closely a modern dictatorship.13
Due to the systematisation and standardisation of Salafi method (manhaj) and the reduction of the creed (ʿaqīda) to a simple set of beliefs, they should not be considered a
“method” and a “creed” but rather be translated as a modern disciplinary mechanism
and ideology. The classic sounding names
such as the Office of Accounting for Right and
Wrong (dīwān al-ḥisba), the Office of Religious Endowments, Da’wa and Mosques
(dīwān al-awqāf, al-daʿwa wa-l-masājid) are
modern forms of control, shored up by the
regular police and the religious police.14 For
instance, the term “muḥāsiba” (supervision) is
known since the Middle Ages, when the
muḥtasib exerted control of the prices in the
market place. In ISIS, muḥāsiba has the function of controlling prices but at the same time
has immeasurably expanded its jurisdiction.
Control is exerted over minute details of daily
life such as clothing for men and women, appearance (beards), regulation of daily practices through prayers (shop opening), games
that are allowed or not allowed, cleanliness,
compulsory prayers, parking tickets, internet
use, cell phones, and travel regulations for
men and women.15 Punishments are propagated and inflicted publicly in order to make
Barkey, Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective, 2008.
Khalil (Makiya), Republic of Fear: The Inside Story of Saddam’s Iraq, 1989.
12
Weiss and Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, 2015, xv, 126.
13
For analysis of ISIS as a state, see McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State, 2015, 89, 93, 96.
14
See for documents or specimen of ISIS the archive Aymenn Jawwad Al-Tamimi has compiled: Al-Tamimi,
Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents, 2015.
15
See for example, Specimen 1N: Establishment of Virtue and Vice Committee (Islamic Court) in Fallujah, January 2014; Specimen E: Prayer Times in Deir az-Zor City (Diwan al-Awqaf wa al-Da’wa wa al-Masajid); AlTamimi, Archive of Islamic State administrative documents, 2015.
10
11
18
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Salafism and the Challenge of Modern Politics
examples.16 Some of these practices are common in Saudi Arabia but are limited to public
life and do not infringe upon one’s honour and
privacy.17 That surveillance and discipline
rather than just piety are the issue is clear
from the demonstrative punishments that are
meted out to shopkeepers, teachers who do
not teach what is required, women who do not
dress properly, and men who do not follow
regulations. Control and punishment are not
just for infringements but also for thought. For
instance, the Office of Religious Endowments,
Da‘wa and Mosques has the function of “deterring the people from falsehood”, “correcting insubordination and putting them on the
path of obedience, and returning the people
to the straight path of God.”18 Special “qualification sessions” (dawrāt al-ta’hiliyya), completed with a “qualification document”
(wathīqat al-ta’hala), bring to mind communist
re-education centres.19
The role of repentance (tawba) seems to underline the doctrinaire character of ISIS. Here
as well the comparison can be made with a
totalitarian state such as the USSR under
Stalin and the political trials in the 1930’s during which people would “repent” and utter
faked “self-accusation” of collaboration with
the enemy. The establishment of special “repentance centres” (marākiz al-istitāba) where
all who “deviate” repent their “sins” is unprecedented and has the purpose of acquir-
ing mind control. 20 The campaign for repentance that singles out teachers underlines the
attempt of the state not just to discipline them
but also then to impose its own Salafi curriculum and train the next generation of indoctrinated citizens. Teachers have the task “to polish minds, refine souls, implant virtues, and
tear out vices”.21 It is true that the state encourages “subjects” (raʿaya) to complain and
stand up for equal rights with fighters, for instance, but given the spread of fear and control this could easily be interpreted as a way to
discover signs of dissidence rather than
search for justice and equality. The hierarchy,
the lack of rights and protection, and the absence of lawyers and an independent judiciary would deter any sensible person from
making complaints. The caliphate of fear is
further deepened by the dichotomous character of the in- and out-group that is typical of
modern totalitarian states. There is no other
example of a historical or modern Muslim
state adopting the doctrine of al-walā’ wa-lbarā’ (loyalty to Muslims and disavowal of
non-Muslims) as a means of creating the distinction between friends and enemies. As the
neighbouring Arab countries are also considered to belong to the dār al-kufr22 (Abode of
Unbelief) and subjects of the caliphate who
take refuge in those countries are immediately
stripped of their possessions and their faith,23
transgressing this boundary is tantamount to
treason. As the Ba’ath had done before, ISIS
Specimen 1C: list of hudud punishments (Aleppo Province); Specimen 1D: Introduction of death penalty for
blasphemy (Jarabulus area: September 2013), Al-Tamimi, Archive of Islamic State administrative documents,
2015.
17
Cook, Forbidding Wrong in Islam: An Introduction, 2003.
18
Specimen 6A: Warning against violating fast in Ramadan5 Ramadan 1436 AH, Al-Tamimi, Archive of Islamic
State administrative documents, 2015.
19
Specimen 3A: Training Session for Teachers (Aleppo Province, May 2014); Specimen 3V: Repentance confirmation document (Deir az-Zor Province), Al-Tamimi, Archive of Islamic State administrative documents,
2015.
20
Specimen 6Q: New Conditions for Repentance, Fallujah (c. late 2014); Specimen Z: Call for Repentance of
Teachers (Ninawa Province, December 2014); Specimen 1B: Invitation to Repentance (Euphrates Province,
8 January 2015); Specimen 1V: Call for repentance of teachers in IS-controlled parts of Syria (February 2015);
Specimen 3B: Repentance for Teachers et al., Manbij (Aleppo Province , April 2015); Specimen 3D: Repentance for Teachers et al. in al-Bab, (Aleppo Province , 9 April 2015)- [identical to 3B], Al-Tamimi, Archive of Islamic State administrative documents, 2015.
21
Al-Tamimi, Archive of Islamic State administrative documents, 2015.
22
Specimen 1Q: Friday sermon for Ninawa Province Mosques (February 2015); Specimen 1R: Friday sermon
for Ninawa Province Mosques, Al-Tamimi, Archive of Islamic State administrative documents, 2015.
23
Specimen 5I. Ultimatum for Medical Professionals and Academics to Return to IS-held areas, Ninawa Province,
May 2015, Al-Tamimi, Archive of Islamic State administrative documents, 2015.
16
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19
Roel Meijer
is trying to create a new unity and discipline
based on a rigid ideology. The particular mixture of obedience (ṭāʿa), faith (imān), minute
regulations, and terror, combined with the ultimate sacrifice in jihad as an individual obligation (fard ʿayn), provides the state with unprecedented means to create a new order
and gives new meaning to term tawhīd (unity
of God) as the unity of mind and body.24
This immediately brings out the weakness of
ISIS. The heavy handed and clumsy terminology of Jihadi Salafism leaves little scope
for modern politics, negotiations, compromises, and ways to channel power politics
and the clash of interests that goes with it. Nationally, its ideological content and repressive
practices leaves the population without rights
versus the state; internationally it leaves it exposed.
III. The Al-Nour Party: Modern terminology
in defence of a classic doctrine
The Al-Nour Party is a completely different
story and demonstrates how political strategies are shaped by circumstances. Whereas
ISIS is the result of war and the defeat of
Sunni Islam in Iraq and Syria, the Al-Nour
Party is the product of the Arab Uprisings and
the demand for civil, political, social, and economic rights in Egypt.25 The Al-Nour Party
was founded by the al-Da‘wat al-Salafiyya in
Alexandria on 22 May 2011, a few months
after the fall of Mubarak, when political parties were allowed to form freely without state
restrictions. From the beginning it regarded itself as a party and distinguished itself by its
adoption of modern terminology. In contrast
to ISIS, the Al-Nour Party has no problems
with claiming to speak in the name of “the
people”, assigning them the modern term “citizens” (muwāṭinūn) instead of “subjects”
(raʿaya), using the term “democracy”, and
claiming rights. Its election programme has
enumerated nine rights, all of which begin
with the sentence “Society demands the right
to…”, each of them a modern right, such as
the right to accountability and oversight, to
choose representatives, to protect livelihood
and house, and to be protected against state
repression. Its tasks are to preserve the identity (hawiyya) of Egypt as a “nation” (waṭan),
guarantee “equal opportunities”, and defend
the “basic rights” (al-ḥuqūq al-asāsiyya) and
“general freedoms” (al-ḥurriyyāt al-ʿāmma) of
citizens. It demands a division of power between the judiciary, legislative, and executive.
In none of these remarks do originally Islamic
terms such as muḥāṣiba (oversight) have
classic Islamic political connotations but instead have the modern meaning of accountability.26 Although its programme has always
been considered exceptionally Western,27 the
election programme of 2015 barely differed
from the one in 2011-12.
This has raised the question whether the AlNour Party is a pragmatic party that works for
the common good within the bounds of a political system and in this pursuit is willing to
make concessions and form coalitions with
other parties, or that works to defend its specific interests, which are limited by its ideology and its specific religious following. The
first seems to be the case. The Al-Nour Party
has been remarkably flexible and agile in
making coalitions. It first tried to make a coalition with the Freedom and Justice Party of the
Muslim Brotherhood, and when this failed it
formed its own coalition of Salafi groups. During the presidential elections of May 2012 it
first supported the candidacy of Muhammed
Mursi but later switched its allegiance to Abd
al-Mun‘aym Abu al-Futtuh, a liberal Islamist
candidate. When he lost the first round it returned to Mursi, only to abandon him when he
became unpopular. The arguments for these
Specimen P: Affirmation of faith (al-Bab: Aleppo Province), May 2014, Al-Tamimi, Archive of Islamic State administrative documents, 2015.
25
See the anthology Meijer and Butenschon, The Crisis of Citizenship in the Arab World, forthcoming.
26
Al-Nour Party Programme (Barnamij Hizb al-Nur), http://hezbel-noor.blogspot.nl/.
27
lacroix, Sheikhs and Politicians: Inside the New Egyptian Salafism, 2012.
24
20
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Salafism and the Challenge of Modern Politics
changes in strategies were political and not
ideological. The Brotherhood was accused of
not wanting to share seats, trying to “Brotherise” state institutions, and making grave political mistakes. The Al-Nour Party, however,
respected the law and considered President
Mursi “legitimate” until very late in June 2013,
just before the military coup, when it abandoned this position because the Brotherhood
did not want to compromise. It worked together with the Brotherhood where they
shared interests, such as the goal to acquire
a majority in the parliamentary elections of
2011-2012 and then in drawing up the constitution in 2012 and assuring that it was in accordance with the Islamic “identity” (hawiyya)
of Egypt. To underline its pragmatism, its
spokesman Nadir Bakkar stated that the AlNour Party would work with any foreign government as long as it was in the interests of
Egypt.28
made apparent on other occasions. Just after
the military coup, it called for a new transitional period during which a government of
neutral technocrats would guide the country
to parliamentary elections.30 It also accused
the military of acting against the will of the
people and of “excluding” Islamists from the
political arena when the public media turned
against the mixing of religion and politics.31 On
another occasion Muhammad Mahyun condemned the violence and unwarranted detention of prisoners by the regime.32 If the strategy of the Al-Nour Party was to take over the
leadership of the Islamist movement from the
Muslim Brotherhood under de aegis of the
military, this failed. During the last elections in
October 2015, it won 12 seats out of the 596;
in the general elections of 2012 it had won
120 seats. The call to retreat from politics and
return to da‘wa has become stronger.
IV. Conclusion
However, at some point the Salafi background
caught up with its claim to represent the “will
of the people.” While it could pretend to act in
the name of the latter until July 2013, after its
support for the military takeover this became
increasingly difficult. The argument of its
leader Muhammad Mahyun that it supported
the military in order to avoid the spilling of “sacred Muslim blood” and act in the interests of
Egypt by supporting “stability” and “security”,
and preventing the “division” of society29
sounded increasingly hollow – as did its earlier claims of being the product of the 25 January Revolution and supporting the “rights of
society” – against the background of the relentless repression of the Al-Sisi regime. In
fact, these first arguments in support of the
military are compatible with classic Salafism
and the doctrine of walī al-amr that al-Da‘wat
al-Salafiyya had followed under Mubarak.
After the military takeover these arguments
were no longer tenable, as the Al-Nour Party
The examples of ISIS and the Al-Nour Party
demonstrate how dependent the Salafi movement is on political circumstances. The huge
divergence in ideas and practice is also explained by the complete lack of political theory within Islam in general and Salafism in
particular. Hanbalism, one of the pillars of current day Salafism, had a strong tendency to
shy away from politics and leave politics undefined, except for the general practice of the
al-siyāsat al-sharʿiyya, which offers much
room for the discretionary powers of the ruler.
This vacuum of theory is manifested in both
examples. In the case of ISIS it takes the form
of making an ideology of the core tenets of
current day Salafism: ḥisba, al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf
wal-nahī ʿan al-munkar (commanding good
and preventing evil, also called ḥisba), alwalā’ wa-l-barā’ (loyalty and disavowal), ṭā‘a
(obedience), tawba (repentance), imān (faith),
jihād, and fard ʿayn (personal obligation).
Shamt, ḥizb al-nūr wa-l-mashhad al-siyāsī al-miṣrī, 2013.
Dawoud, Al-Nour Party ‘Loyal to its Principles’, 2014.
30
Hussein, Al-Nour Party: Don’t Blame the Islamists fo the Mistakes of the Muslim Brotherhood, 2013.
31
El Bilad, Interview with Muhammad Masyun, 2013.
32
Amara, Al-Nour Party Head: Brotherhood Should Support New Constitution, 2014.
28
29
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Roel Meijer
These principles are turned into the pillars of
a totalitarian system, reaching into the private
lives of the citizens, and are used as disciplinary measures of control by the state, or
caliphate. In the case of the Al-Nour Party, the
reverse has happened. The vacuum of political theory has been filled by a democratic discourse of civil, political, social, and economic
rights and a division of powers, which bear
some resemblance to the classic Islamic political system but basically derive from Western political thought. However, both organisations ultimately run into political trouble: ISIS
on account of its misuse of religious terms for
an exclusivist and repressive political system,
and the Al-Nour Party because it tries to revert to the classic idea of walī al-amr and obedience to the ruler while having legitimated itself as a democratic (but not liberal) party that
derives its legitimacy from the people. These
problems have arisen as a result of the forced
politicisation of the Salafi movement after the
Arab Uprisings, when for many Salafis it was
no longer possible to remain quietist and
many Sunnis were looking for an alternative
political system.33
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All internet sources were accessed and verified on March 15, 2016.
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