Archive

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi's Blog

Cognitive Egocentrism and the Palestinian Cause

The term 'cognitive egocentrism' was long ago coined by Richard Landes to describe the phenomenon of projecting one's own assumptions and ideals about the world onto others. I first remember reading Landes' description of cognitive egocentrism in around 2008 or so. More than 15 years later, the notion of cognitive egocentrism remains highly relevant, especially with a considerable amount of discourse about the Palestinian cause since 7 October 2023 (though in many ways that discourse is a continuity of what came before).

Leaving aside questions of rights and wrongs, it seems to me that any political cause needs to be understood and dealt with according to the realities on the ground, and not on the basis of wishful thinking on the part of outsiders. Thus, the Palestinian cause and what represents it are defined principally by the Palestinians themselves who are on the ground in the Palestinian territories and the Palestinian factions that represent them. In turn, on the wider regional scale, the cause is principally defined and represented by the Palestinians in neighbouring countries and the factions that represent them.

When this point is borne in mind, it becomes apparent that some of the discourse about the Palestinian cause in the pro-Palestine protests and wider advocacy in Western countries is well out of touch with those realities, and instead projects its own intellectual fantasies and ideals onto the Palestinian cause.

Continue to full text of posting...

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi  |  Mon, April 29, 2024  |  Permalink

Qur'anic Studies and the Early History of Islam

How far can the traditional narratives about the emergence of a particular religion be considered to correspond to historical reality? This sort of question is especially relevant for religions in the more distant past such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

By now, there is a huge amount of research in the field of Biblical criticism, which explores Biblical texts from a variety of angles such as textual criticism (trying to determine the original text based on surviving manuscripts) and source criticism (trying to determine sources for those texts) and then the wider question of the historicity of the narratives contained in those texts. The corresponding research approaches in Western scholarship to Islamic texts- in particular, the Qur'an- have been seen as lagging behind Biblical studies, but I think there is a potential to mischaracterise the field. That is, it might be assumed by some that the study of the early history of Islam is marred by 'political correctness' and a fear of offending Muslims that prevents scholars from being too bold in questioning the origins of Islam. Such an impression, for example, was reinforced by the publication of 'The Syro-Aramaic Reading of the Koran' under the pseudonym of 'Christoph Luxenberg' in a bid to protect against reprisals.

Continue to full text of posting...

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi  |  Sat, April 27, 2024  |  Permalink

"Martyrs of Maaloula"

Of the three villages in the Qalamoun region to the west of Damascus that have preserved the Western Neo-Aramaic language, Maaloula is the most well-known, being a primarily Christian village. It was overrun by insurgent groups in 2013 before subsequently being recaptured by the Syrian army and its allies. As part of my ongoing efforts to document the Western Neo-Aramaic language and also to preserve the historical record, I present here a post documenting the 'martyrs' of Maaloula during the war in Syria (consisting of both military personnel who fought on the government side and civilians) with an introductory text in three languages: Western Neo-Aramaic, Arabic and English.

For the Western Neo-Aramaic version, I feature the dialects of Jub'addin and Bakh'a (the two other villages whose inhabitants speak the language). One speaker from Jub'addin was even kind enough to provide me a version of the introductory text written in Syriac script. If you are using a Mac computer with Google Chrome browser, the Syriac text may not show on this post, in which case, switch to Safari browser.

(Western Neo-Aramaic: Jub'addin dialect)

ܡܥܠܘܠܐ ܒܠܳܬܐ ܐܰܝܒܐ ܒ ܛܘܪܐ ܕܶܩܠܡܘܢܐ ܘ ܡܪܳܗ ܩܪܝܘܝܶܢ ܘ ܐܶܒܐ ܚܒܳܢ ܩܠܝܣܳܬ݂ܐ ܥܫ̃ܝܟܰܢ . ܐܶܫܢ 2013 ܐܶܥܒܪ ܐܶܠܗ ܕܶ ܫ̃ܡܰܪܶܕܶܢ ܘܶ ܒ ܦܜܶܠ ܓܰܝܫܐ ܣܳܪܳܗ ܘ ܕܶ ܐܰܝܒܢ ܥܶܡܶܗ ܢܶܦܟܬ݂ ܡ ܫ̃ܳܚܫ̃ܶ ܙܰܘܥܐ . ܡܰܪܳܗ ܚܰܡܶܠ ܚܳܠܳܢ ܒ ܗܰܘܝܬ݂ܳܢ ܘ ܗܝܗ ܩܕܡܬ݂ 30 ܫܰܗܝܕ ܘ ܗܳܫ ܒܢܰܐ ܡܢܫܘܪܐ ܒܚ ܢܰܪܶܢܚܶܢ ܫܡܐܝ ܫ̃ܪܳܡܐ

Continue to full text of posting...

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi  |  Wed, April 24, 2024  |  Permalink

مقابلة مع اعلام اللواء ٣٢

من المعروف أنّ قوات الحشد الشعبي تنقسم بشكل رئيسي الى ألوية لها أرقام وهي تتبع لهيئة الحشد الشعبي. بالاضافة الى هذه الألوية، قامت العديد من الوحدات الأصغر منذ انشاء الحشد وهي معروفة بالأفواج.، وهذه الأفواج عبارة عن تشكيلات محلية وأصبحت معروفة ب"الحشد العشائري" بشكل غير رسمي. ولكننا نرى في الفترة الأخيرة تنظيم عدة أفواج في المحافظات تحت ألوية جديدة مع تتبيعها لقيادات عمليات الحشد في المحافظات. على سبيل المثال، يكون اللواء ٥٩ واللواء ٧٤ في نينوى عبارة عن أفواج محلية في محافظة نينوى تم تنظيمها وتتبيعها لقيادة عمليات الحشد في محافظة نينوى بقيادة خضير المطروحي.

وفي هذا المنشور نسلط الضوء على اللواء ٣٢ وهو لواء جديد يضم بعض الأفواج في محافظة صلاح الدين ويتبع اللواء لقيادة عمليات الحشد في محافظة صلاح الدين بقيادة الحاج صفاء الساعدي. واليكم المقابلة التي أجريتها مع اعلام اللواء لكي أزودكم بنبذة مختصرة عن اللواء ودوره في الدفاع عن الوطن والحفاظ على الأمن والأمان.

Continue to full text of posting...

By أيمن جواد التميمي  |  Sun, April 21, 2024 7:38 PM  |  Permalink

The Consolidation of Local Hashd Units: The Case of Brigade 32 (Interview)

By now, it is well-known that Iraq's Hashd Sha'abi (Popular Mobilisation Forces) are principally organised into various brigades that have ordinal numbers and are officially affiliated with the Hashd Sha'abi Commission. In addition to these brigades, various smaller 'regiments' (Arabic: afwaj) have arisen during the course of the Hashd's existence. Many of these regiments reflect more local formations and have often been informally dubbed 'tribal Hashd.' However, a more recent trend in Hashd Brigade organisation has been to consolidate provincial regiments into brigades and attach them directly to the Hashd provincial operations commands. For example, Brigades 59 and 74 reflect consolidation of Hashd regiments in Ninawa province (Brigade 74 being particular to the Sinjar area) and their attachment to the Ninawa province operations command of the Hashd that is presently headed by Khudayr al-Matruhi who is tied to Brigade 21 (Badr).

Continue to full text of posting...

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi  |  Sun, April 21, 2024 3:27 PM  |  Permalink

الضربات الإسرائيلية الجديدة على جنوب سوريا: مقابلة

في سياق ضرباتها على إيران رداً على الضربات الإيرانية التي استهدفت إسرائيل ثأراً لقصف القنصلية الإيرانية في دمشق، شنت إسرائي هجوماً جديداً على منطقة ازرع الواقعة في محافظة درعا بجنوب سوريا. مع أنّ هناك الكثير من التعليقات على ما سيجري الآن، يبدو أنّ الجهود الإعلامية في التواصل مع السكان القاطنين في المنطقة المحلية التي وقعت فيها الضربات والتعرف على موقفهم من الأحداث ناقصة. وهذا التقصير مؤسف، إلا أنّه جزء من مشكلة كبيرة في التغطية الإعلامية، فمع المئات من الضربات الإسرائيلية على مر السنين، بالكاد لم يتواصل الإعلام والمحللون مع الناس الذين يعيشون في المناطق التي تعرضت للضربات.

Continue to full text of posting...

By أيمن جواد التميمي  |  Fri, April 19, 2024 8:00 PM  |  Permalink

Israel's New Strikes on Southern Syria: A Local Perspective

As part of its strikes in retaliation for Iran's strikes that were in turn retaliation for the bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Israel conducted an attack on Syrian territory: specifically the Izraa area in Deraa province in southern Syria. While there is much punditry speculating on what happens next, there seems to have been little effort to reach out to those living in the vicinity of where the strikes took place and get their perspective on what is happening. This is an unfortunate shortcoming, but the problem is part of a wider pattern of deficiency in coverage. With the hundreds of Israeli strikes on Syria over the years, there has been hardly any outreach by media outlets and analysts to those living in the areas where the strikes have taken place.

To try to remedy this deficiency, today I decided to interview someone I know who comes from the town of Ghabagheb in Deraa province, some distance to the north of where the strikes occurred. This perspective, which is well worth highlighting, is reflective of a Syrian citizen supportive of the Syrian government and a Ba'ath Party loyalist. The interview is slightly edited and condensed for clarity.

Continue to full text of posting...

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi  |  Fri, April 19, 2024 8:00 PM  |  Permalink

The Islamic State vs. al-Qa'ida in Somalia

While following the Islamic State's daily claims of operations can be useful in giving an overview of the group's activities on weekly, monthly and annual bases, there are cases where the group's affiliates have little to say on a daily basis about their activities but are then subsequently revealed to be engaged in operations and/or military campaigns that are retroactively claimed and reported in the weekly Arabic-language al-Naba' newsletter. This is what we see with the Islamic State's 'Somalia province' affiliate, which has not claimed any operations since early February but is in fact engaged in a sustained campaign against al-Qa'ida affiliate Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin (al-Shabaab for shorthand) in eastern Somalia. Like other al-Qa'ida affiliates, al-Shabaab is deemed 'apostate' by the Islamic State, not only for rejecting the Islamic State's Caliphate project but also actively fighting against the Islamic State. Indeed, some biographies of Islamic State 'martyrs' I examined as part of my doctoral thesis included members who had been assassinated by al-Shabaab.

The latest report in al-Naba' documents the 'second' phase of the Islamic State Somalia province campaign against al-Shabaab. This phase began on 28 January and ended on 9 April.

Continue to full text of posting...

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi  |  Fri, April 19, 2024 7:17 PM  |  Permalink

Iran's Strikes on Israel

I am sure many of my readers were up late last night live-tracking the strikes by Iran and its 'axis of resistance' against Israel in retaliation for the Israeli bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus. The strikes themselves were bigger in scale than might have been expected but were nonetheless calibrated, with Iran considering its response to be sufficient if the response deters future Israeli strikes on Iranian targets.

In light of the unprecedented nature of the strikes on Israel, it is tempting to carry headlines about how the fate of the entire Middle East supposedly hangs on the edge. Yet this sort of talk is very sensationalist. The prospect of an all-out regional war is still far-fetched, simply because neither Israel nor Iran wants it. Ultimately, as Jonathan Spyer has pointed out, the Iranian and 'resistance axis' long-term strategy regarding Israel is not that a major regional war needs to be launched or that nuclear weapons need to be acquired for the purpose of striking and wiping out Israel in one massive blow . Rather, the logic is that Israel is seen as internally weak and fragile (hence the common refrain that Israel is supposedly 'weaker than a spider's web') and thus continual pressure without launching an all-out regional war can eventually induce Israel's collapse. There is no reason to think that this logic has changed. In this context also, Iran's drive to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons manufacturing capability should be seen as motivated by a desire to establish deterrence against disruption of its activities and those of its regional allies.

Continue to full text of posting...

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi  |  Sun, April 14, 2024  |  Permalink

The Escalation in Islamic State Operations Against the Syrian Democratic Forces

In queries I have received over the years, I have often been asked if an Islamic State attack or set of attacks over a short-time span in Iraq and/or Syria constituted a 'resurgence' for the group. In general, I do not believe that this sort of framing is the right word, because then the following question arises: what exactly does 'resurgence' mean? Does it mean a revival on the path towards recreating the peak of the group's fortunes in the 2014-2015 period when it seized and controlled substantial amounts of territory spanning the Iraq and Syria borders? This is of course ultimately how the Islamic State frames its general insurgent strategy: namely, that through persistence in waging jihad, it can gradually wear down its enemies to the point of inducing a rapid collapse and swift conquest, similar to what happened with the takeover of Mosul and other areas in Iraq and Syria in the summer of 2014.

Yet few would argue that the Islamic State is close to realising such a goal. Rather than speaking of 'resurgence', it is more useful to ask for a given period in Iraq and/or Syria: has there been an escalation in the scale of the Islamic State's insurgent activities? In the case of Syria, in the recent period (in particular since the beginning of this year), there is good evidence for an escalation in the Islamic State's insurgent activities, in the areas spanning those controlled by the Syrian government and the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in central, eastern and northeastern Syria, as will be explained below.

Continue to full text of posting...

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi  |  Fri, April 12, 2024  |  Permalink

Archive Listing