Previously on this blog I featured a translation and analysis I did of a study by the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) on disrupted terrorist plots in the West. It was the monstrous academic Thomas Hegghammer who highlighted that study. He kindly drew my attention to another interesting PST study that was published in March 2019 and has not been translated until now. The study on the backgrounds of people in the far-right extremist milieus in Norway. The study distinguishes two types of far-right extremism: the neo-Nazi type, and the more 'culturalist' anti-immigration/anti-Islamic type, though the study also says there can be overlap between the two. Further, the study highlights two types of activity: physical (i.e. on the ground) and online. In summary, based on its data-set of far-right extremists, PST makes the following observations on their backgrounds:
- They are disproportionately men.
- Both young and old become far-right extremists, though the average age of 'radicalization' is apparently lower among the neo-Nazi types.
- Most live in the eastern region of Norway, and far-right extremism is less of an urban phenomenon in comparison with Islamist extremism.
- The level of educational attainment among far-right extremists is generally lower than the general population. In comparing the far-right extremists with the general population, a higher proportion of the former only got so far as completing 'foundation school' (primary and lower secondary school: the minimum compulsory education in Norway up to age 16), a somewhat lower proportion of them completed secondary school (upper secondary school up to age 19), and relatively few have university/college education.
- Much higher unemployment levels among far-right extremists than the rest of the population.
- Most are unmarried but more than half have children.
- There are considerable rates of mental disorders, adjustment problems, substance abuse issues and exposure to violence among the far-right extremists.
- The vast majority have committed criminal acts of some sort, many related to violence.
Below is the study in full with my translation. Note that the endnotes are part of the original study. Further, I have translated the visual representations of data in square brackets. Any suggestions for amendments regarding my translation are most welcome.
Police Security Service
Theme report: What backgrounds do people in far-right extremist milieus in Norway have?
Document date: 1 March 2019
Reference number: 17/12585-16
This report builds on background-information on 109 far-right extremist persons, who PST was worried were in a radicalization-process in 2018. Our survey shows that there was an increase in the radicalization to far-right extremism in 2015. The asylum influx is an important mobilization-factor for the milieu. The level of immigration will probably provoke radicalization to far-right extremism in Norway also in the future.
People who are radicalized to far-right extremism today, constitute a broader age-range than that which was found in the 1990s. Older people are radicalized in greater degree than before- especially owing to far-right extremism's hostility to immigration and Islam. This separates the far-right extremism from extreme Islamist milieus.
There is a high occurrence of vulnerability factors among the far-right extremists in the selection. This particularly manifests itself in psychological disorders/developmental disorders, adjustment problems and substance abuse. Such vulnerabilities are also prevalent among people in extreme Islamist milieus in Norway. Compare with PST's subject report on the background of people tied to extreme Islamism in 2016. In addition a high proportion of the far-right extremists in the study have themselves been exposed to acts of violence.
More than half of the far-right extremists in this analysis stand outside of working life. Such a connection to working life is also a tendency within extreme Islamist milieus in Norway. It is striking that so many in extreme milieus stand outside an area that generally provides helpful effects.
Overall 83% of those who feature in the analysis have criminal records. Many have also committed violence-related offences. A high share of violence-related criminality, including violence that is politically/racially motivated, shows that there is a potential for violence in the far-right extremist milieus in Norway. This can increase if there occurs a case that mobilizes.
The majority of the people in the selection are residents of the eastern region. Only a minority are residents in the capital- something that can reveal that the breeding ground for far-right extremist attitudes is somewhat lower in large cities than in more rural areas. A much higher share of extreme Islamists are in contrast residents of Oslo.
Physical activism and activism on the Internet are important areas for far-right activity. Activism can be areas where one can express frustration and can therefore reduce the need to commit politically motivated violence. On the other hand it can contribute to an enabling of far-right extremism and thus have an inspirational effect.
For people who gravitate to extreme milieus, the ideological aspect often comes in second place. Often there are the social relations that are the main reason why people are radicalized.
Many actors have a role to prevent radicalization. It is therefore important that there should be good interdepartmental prevention schemes, as well as focus on early prevention. The findings in this report show that many of the far-right extremists have problems tied to mental health, adjustment, unemployment and criminality. Thus health-care, schools/education, the NAV, the Correctional Service and the police are particularly important actors in prevention work.
The PST has examined more closely socio-economic hallmarks of far-right extremists in Norway. Such background is important to identify eventual risk-groups, as well as possible motivations and driving factors for such milieus. These are important in working with threat assessments, but also in prevention work against radicalization[i] to violent extremism.[ii]
[table on right: point in time of radicalization: 1990-2016]
In 2016 a similar study was done by PST on extreme Islamists in Norway.[iii]
The report bases itself on what we assess as the representative selection of persons in far-right extremist milieus which PST today is concerned are accepting, or have the will to commit violence for their political or ideological goals. The selection is colored by PST's focus on priorities. Moreover, there are challenges tied to uncertain figures and erroneous interpretations regarding the validity of the findings. This is reflected in the assessments as far as possible.
Many far-right extremist expressions
Far-right extremism has today many expressions, which show a broad spectrum of beliefs and ideologies. This is dealt with according to primary categories: one form is neo-Nazi far-right extremism, which is focused on a biological hierarchy and has at its core the belief that one race is superior to others. Another form is the anti-Islamic/anti-immigration far-right extremism that does not focus on race, but rather on culture. A central premise is that the European/Nordic/Norwegian culture and the national identity are threatened by an external enemy, often Islam. Both forms have clear touches of conspiratorial ideas, and there are no sharp distinctions between the two categories.
The point in time of radicalization
It is challenging to define a concrete point for radicalization. Radicalization is seldom a linear process, but rather dynamic and disconnected as many conditions come into play. Therefore we have tried to set a point of radicalization for all who are included in the selection.
The point of radicalization ranges between 1990 and 2017. A small share became radicalized in the latter half of the 1990s. This somewhat levels out in the 2000s, but seriously picks up in the period around 2011-2017.[iv] It is important to note that the distribution shows some people who are active in the far-right extremist milieu today have become radicalized. Many of those who were active in the 1990s have now broken out of the milieu, and/or PST has not obtained any information on them. So they will no longer be on our registers.
The vast majority of those who are active today- 70%- became radicalized between 2010 and 2017. The peak was reached in 2015, and then drops somewhat in 2017.
2011 and 2015 stand out as years where many became radicalized. The increase in 2011 may have connection with the terrorist attacks of 22 July 2011, which resulted in an increased focus on far-right extremism in the PST and in society at large. The increase can therefore probably be attributed to an increase of informing of the services, but it can also be due to the fact that the terror attack itself inspired some to give more clear expression of far-right extremist viewpoints. The big increase in the number of those seeking asylum in Norway, which reached its pinnacle in 2015, has also probably radicalized more people, and therefore again led to the PST having registered more people.
What characterizes people in far-right extremist milieus in Norway?
Considerable over-representation of men
Men are considerably over-represented in the selection. 86% are men and 14% are women. Men are over-represented in both main categories of far-right extremism.
That it is mostly men who are included in extreme milieus has also been observed within extreme Islamism. Within far-right extremism masculinity often becomes idealized and emphasized. There is also a clear anti-feminism as well as idealization of traditional gender roles. Men's domination and control, especially within neo-Nazi far-right extremism, can possibly make the milieus less attractive for girls.
[pie-chart for gender: 86% men and 14% women]
In the selection there are more women (percentage-wise) in the anti-immigration/anti-Islam far-right extremism than in the neo-Nazism. The women in the anti-Islam milieus are on average older than in the neo-Nazi ones, and they also have somewhat more prominent roles. It can thus suggest that the women have different motivations for entering into far-right extremist milieus.
Both young and old become far-right extremists
The selection shows a spread age-range for the point of radicalization. It varies between 15 and 63 years. The center of gravity lies at those in the age group 40 years and younger, but there are also found people who became radicalized when they were more than 40 years old.
The average age for radicalization is different in the main categories of far-right extremism. The average age is lowest among the followers of the neo-Nazi far-right extremism: 27 years (median 27). For the anti-immigration/anti-Islam people the average age for radicalization is 40 years (median 41). For those who have a foot in both main categories the average age for radicalization is 31 years (median 27). People who are radicalized from the anti-Islam milieus are thus older than those who are radicalized from the neo-Nazi milieus and those who have a foot in both categories.
If one looks at the decade in which the people are radicalized (1990s, 2000s and 2010s), those who became radicalized in the 1990s were younger when they became radicalized than that which was the case in the 2000s and 2010s. The average age for radicalization is 22.4 years in the 1990s, 27.1 years in the 2000s and 30.9 years in the 2010s. These statistics thus show that the people who are radicalized to far-right extremism today are on average older than before. Far-right extremism was in the 1990s first and foremost a youth phenomenon. Today there are still many young people who are radicalized, but older people are also drawn to the milieus. These people are, as previously described, especially persons in the anti-Islam/anti-immigration camp.
[bar-chart for average age of radicalization, divided by decade: 22.4 years in the 1990s, 27.1 years in the 2000s and 30.9 years in the 2010s]
Most live in the eastern region
The majority (67%) of the selection are residents in the eastern region.[v] The remainder are distributed throughout the land. This pattern is distributed relatively alike per type of far-right extremism. That most in the selection are residents in the eastern region may have a connection with population density, but may also be linked to biases in the selection.
Relatively few are residents in large cities. For example only 7% live in Oslo. It can thus seem as though far-right extremism is not a typical urban phenomenon. There is probably no simple explanation for this. It is also interesting that in the rest of the population people resident in densely populated neighborhoods (over 100,000) have more benevolent attitudes to immigration and immigrants and more contact with immigrants, than those who live in rural areas.[vi]
Usually low education but also some with high
The majority of the selection have lower levels of education (foundation school and secondary school as highest completed schooling). The data show that 17% have foundation school, 21% have dropped out of secondary school, 39% have completed secondary school, 3% are currently in higher education and 13% have completed higher education (university/college).[vii] There is a somewhat lower level of education than in the population in general.[viii] The selection has a higher share with foundation school as highest education, somewhat lower number with completed secondary school and relatively few with higher education.
[pie-chart for highest completed level of education: 17% foundation school, 39% secondary school, 13% college/university, 21% dropped out of secondary school, 3% started higher education, 7% unknown]
If one adjusts for age (30 years and older), 39% of the selection have foundation school as highest completed education. 37% have secondary school as the highest completed education, and 19% have higher education or have started higher education (university/college).
In general there is a connection between level of education and attitudes towards immigration. Those with low education are often more skeptical than those with high education.[ix] This may give a possible explanation in that the neo-Nazi and anti-immigration/anti-Islam milieus attract people with lower education.
Still there is the 16% who have high education or have commenced higher education from high-school/university. This shows that far-right extremism today also attracts some people with long schooling. This is distributed relatively alike among the main categories of far-right extremism.
More than half are not in jobs
More than half (52%) of the selection are not in work. The remaining 41% have full-time jobs, while 7% have part-time jobs. This is a lower level of employed people than in the rest of the population.[x] The vast majority in the selection (96%) are as of now in the ages 20-66 years, and must therefore be considered to be in working age. Compared with the rest of the population for comparison, the far-right extremists in this selection have a much lower rate of employment.
The people in the selection who are in work are especially employed within building and construction and different services professions (serving, store employees and cleaning).
The vast majority in the selection have on the other hand been within work life at some point in life. If one thus looks at the people who are now 25 years or older, there are only 7% who are not registered with a work history.
Of those who are currently outside work, the proportion is highest among the people who are anti-immigration/anti-Islam far-right extremists. Of these 70% are not in the work register at the present time. The proportion outside work within the neo-Nazi far-right extremists is 44%, and 57% for those who have a foot in both camps.
Work life is generally healthy. This is so through the securing of personal finances, giving of structure in daily life, creation of belonging and increase of self-esteem.[xi] The fact that so many of the far-right extremists in this selection are not in work, illustrates a form of exclusion. Also today's working live in increasing form requires formal education: this can contribute to these people becoming even further removed from the work market.
[pie-chart: proportion in work. 52% not in work, 41% full-time employment, 7% part-time employment]
Most have civil status as 'unmarried'- but more than half have children
The majority in the selection have civil status 'unmarried': 72%. If one only looks at people who are 40 years or older, 59% are unmarried, 19% are married, but 22% are separated/divorced.
In Norway the average age for getting married is just under 40 years for men and around 35 for women. Marriage generally occurs later in life than that which was the case before. The proportion of the population who choose co-habitation over marriage is rising and is most common among the young. There is nevertheless a higher proportion of the far-right extremists in the selection who are unmarried, compared with the rest of the population.[xii]
56% of the far-right extremists in the selection have children. If one only looks at people over 45 years, 71% have children, while 29% are childless. In the rest of the population the proportion of childless men over 45 years is at 23%.[xiii] Thus there is a slightly higher proportion of childless men over 45 years in this selection than in the rest of the population.
The fact that such a large proportion of the selection in the 40s and over are neither married nor have children, can be a possible vulnerability factor. In far-right extremist milieus children, family and traditional gender roles often have an important place. That one is not a part of this can possibly be experienced as a burden.
However, over half of the selection (regardless of age) have children. These have a caring role, and it is thus of interest whether these children will thus inherit their elders' far-right extremist views. There are many examples in which such attitudes become inherited, but also examples in which children completely abandon such attitudes.
High occurrence of mental disorders, adjustment problems and substance abuse.
A third of the selection- 33%- have had/have a form of mental disorder or developmental disorder, of varying character and severity.[xiv] Throughout there are in particular cases of anxiety, depression and personality disorders, but there are also cases of lesser mental disorders. The proportion of the selection with mental disorders/adjustment problems is higher among far-right extremists than that which we know of among extreme Islamists.[xv] There is also a higher proportion of the selection who have mental disorders than in the population in general.[xvi]
Nearly half of the selection- 46%- have had various forms of adjustment problems. The picture is complicated, but particularly concerns challenges tied to bullying, loneliness, small social network, rootlessness and low self-esteem, failing caregivers and child welfare, criminality and psychiatry. Individuals in the selection have also had a difficult upbringing. In general in the population there are many who struggle to adapt. Among other things, one fifth of Norwegians feel lonely, and many are regularly exposed to bullying.[xvii]
In general in the population, alcoholism is the most frequent substance abuse disorder in Norway.[xx] Consumption of illicit substances, especially cannabis, is relatively widespread.[xxi] The proportion of substance abuse disorders among the far-right extremists seems to be far higher than that which is normal in the population.
Substance abuse, adjustment problems and mental disorders are often related. Vulnerability factors tied to adjustment and substance abuse are also relatively common within extreme Islamist milieus. Studies show that there are few who enter into extreme milieus solely because of ideological reasons. For many the social relations are an important driving factor into the milieus. This is where they are taken care of and accepted for who they are.[xxii] Studies have also shown that radicalization often seriously starts when people become socialized into the milieu. This is first, then they acquire far-right extremist attitudes.[xxiii] The social and relational dimensions are therefore a significant motivation for attraction to extreme milieus. Thus accidents, social relations and acquaintances can have impact on which persons are those who become attracted to extreme milieus, and which are those who do not become attracted.
[bar chart: proportion with mental disorders, adjustment problems and substance abuse challenges, percent: 33% mental disorders, 46% adjustment problems, 42% substance abuse]
Many have themselves been exposed to violence
Some 41% of those who come under this analysis have themselves been exposed to violence.[xxiv] The majority are offended in one assault case, while some are offended in several. The severity in the cases varies. The majority have been exposed to less severe violence (common assault/battery), which is especially connected with nightlife violence and/or attack by opponents, often left-wing extremists. The cases that involve graver violence are fewer, but involve among other things violence in near relations, assault/bodily harm and sexualized violence.
It is interesting that so many people in the selection have been exposed to violence. It is generally straining to become exposed to violence. It can therefore be a vulnerability factor and contribute to weakened trust in human beings and in society at large. There are grounds to assume that there are dark figures here.
Many have committed criminal acts
A high proportion of the far-right extremists in the sample have committed criminal acts. Some 83% are registered with unlawful acts in the criminal records. Only 17% are otherwise not registered with criminality. Some have committed a small number of criminal acts, but others are registered with a large number of unlawful acts. A broad spectrum of criminality and degrees of severity are represented.
[pie-chart for commission of criminal acts: 83% yes, 17% no].
There is a spread in ages with first time registration in the criminal registry. Just under 70% were under 25 years when they became registered with criminal offences for the first time.
That so many of the far-right extremists in the selection have committed criminality indicates that many have had a lack of respect for common laws and regulations. This again suggests adjustment problems. Far-right extremist milieus thus seem to attract people with a criminal history, especially people who have committed criminality in young ages. This is also prevalent within extreme Islamist milieus in Norway. Here just under 70% of persons were registered with criminality before they became radicalized.
Many have committed violence-related acts
In the extremist perspective the types of criminality involving violence, threats, violation of the weapons laws and hateful utterances are of particular interest. These law violations are violence-related and can thus be indicative of a reduced threshold to commit politically motivated violent acts.
41% of the sample have committed less severe violent acts, and 35% have committed grave violence.[xxv] 36% are registered for threats, 32% are reported for violation of the weapons laws and 16% for hateful utterances.
The high occurrence of the aforementioned law-violations indicates that far-right extremist milieus attract people with a history of violence, and indicate a lack of respect for the sacrosanctity of fellow human beings and regulations tied to weapons-use. Hateful utterances, in the criminal sense, are a relatively new statutory authority. It is therefore likely that there are dark figures here.
One in two have committed political or racially-motivated violence
13% of the selection have committed an offence that is considered here as a political and/or racially motivated violent act. These acts vary in scope and severity.
[bar-chart for violence-related criminality, percent: 41% less severe violence, 35% grave violence, 36% threats, 32% violation of weapons laws, 16% hateful utterances]
In brief summary, all in the selection who have committed a political and/or racist violent act are men. They became radicalized in the 1990s and from 2010. All were under 30 years when they became radicalized, half were under 20 years. Many have had adjustment problems and substance abuses, but just a few have suffered mental disorders. All were under 30 years when they became registered with criminal offences for the first time. Of these people, nearly half were under 18 years. A little under half have themselves been offended in cases of violence. They have lower level of education: half have foundation school and half have secondary school as highest completed education. No one has as of now completed higher education.
Arena for activism
Both the physical room and the Internet are important arenas for far-right extremist utterances. The people who come under this analysis make use of both arenas, often in a combination. Both are central in the radicalization perspective.
Over half of the people in the selection engage primarily in physical activism: 'on the street'.[xxvi] These are mainly people from the Neo-Nazi far-right extremism. The adherents of the anti-Islam/anti-immigration far-right extremism are more present on the Internet- 'online'- than the neo-Nazis. Blogging, websites and social media are used actively. These pages often have a staunch Islamophobic and ultra-nationalist focus. They operate in large part as 'echo-chambers' in which the utterances are subject to little challenge. Many within the anti-immigration/anti-Islam forms of far-right extremism often combine Internet with physical activism, where often in the form of demonstrations, they appeal and come together with like-minded people.
The Internet has become an increasingly important arena among extremists, where they can cultivate their ideological bed-fellows, recruit and radicalize new sympathizers and conduct training of dedicated activists.[xxvii] The Internet has also made extreme ideologies readily available,[xxviii] and can therefore lead to greater dissemination. Although the Internet is considered to be an important arena for far-right extremist utterances, this does not mean that people who engage in online-activism are able to mobilize in the real world. Today there are in general many who can engage in their political participations through keystrokes on the Internet and social media, but who do not take the step out in the 'real world'.[xxix]
Radicalizers: somewhat more resourceful
In this analysis there is a made a distinction between radicalizers[xxx] and radicalized. 37% of the selection are considered to be radicalizers. There are no big differences in profile between these two big categories.
If there should be any differences highlighted, the radicalizers are somewhat less vulnerable than the radicalized. They have somewhat lower incidence of mental disorders, adjustment problems and substance abuse. There is a lower proportion of the radicalizers who are registered with criminal acts. They also have a somewhat higher level of education, as well as a higher proportion with ties to employment. This indicates that the radicalizers, collectively, stand out by being a little more resourceful than those who are 'only' considered to be radicalized.
Considerations: significance of the findings for the threat picture
The increase in radicalization to far-right extremism in 2015 shows how the growth in asylum-seeking is an important mobilization factor for the milieu. The degree of immigration will undoubtedly influence the radicalization to far-right extremism in Norway also in future times. For example any new marked increase in number of asylum seekers- with subsequent establishment of asylum reception centers- could attract more people into far-right extremist milieus.
People who are radicalized to far-right extremism today, constitute a broader age-span than that which was the case in the 1990s. Older people are radicalized in greater degree than before, especially to the anti-Islam far-right extremism. This is different from the extreme Islamist milieus, the majority of which is under 30 years. Both within extreme Islam and far-right extremism it has nonetheless been primarily young men who committed politically motivated acts of violence, although exceptions exist.
There is a high occurrence of vulnerability factors among the far-right extremists in the selection. This is especially linked to mental disorders/developmental disorders, adjustment problems and substance abuse. Such vulnerabilities are also prevalent among people in extreme Islamist milieus in Norway. In addition we see that a high level of the far-right extremists (41%) themselves are exposed to violence. Health care is therefore an important actor to catch people who may be at risk of becoming radicalized, or who are already radicalized.
More than half of the far-right extremists are outside work life. Weak connection to work life is also a tendency within extreme Islamist milieus in Norway. It is notable that so many in extreme in extreme milieus are outside an area that in general gives many positive health effects. Idleness and much excess time can be negative for the threat picture, as it provides time to cultivate extreme ideologies. This can contribute to additional radicalization. This can also create a feeling of alienation and additional reinforcing vulnerabilities.
The majority of the people in the selection are residents of the eastern region. That only a few are resident in the capital may indicate that the breeding grounds for far-right extremist attitudes are somewhat lower in large cities than in more rural areas. Within extreme Islamism on the other hand it was seen that a much higher proportion are resident in Oslo.
Very many of the far-right extremists- 83%- are registered with criminality. Many have also committed violence-related law violations. This is negative for the threat-picture, as these have crossed a boundary for breaking of the law as a means for resolving a problem. That so many in far-right extremist milieus in Norway have committed violence-related criminality, including violence that is politically/racially motivated, shows that there is a potential for violence in the milieus. This can increase with a case that mobilizes, such as for example a new marked increase in asylum seekers, and Islamist terrorist attacks in Norway or general criminality committed by immigrants.
This survey shows that both physical activism and the Internet are important arenas for far-right extremist activity. Both forms of activism can have both positive and negative effects for the threat picture. Activism, whether that is physical or on the net, can be arenas where one can find an outlet for frustration. This can diminish the need to commit politically motivated violence, and thus be positive for the threat picture. But on the other hand, this can also influence the threat picture negatively, because activism contributes to far-right extremism becoming accessible, and can have an inspiring effect.
The fact that 40% of the people in the selection are considered to be radicalizers, shows that there is a significant proportion of people who wish to attract people into far-right extremist milieus. That the radicalizers are somewhat more resourceful than the radicalized also applies for extreme Islamism in Norway. This is natural, seen in light of their role and position.
For people who seek out extreme milieus, the ideological aspect often comes in second place. Often there are the social relations that are the main reason that people come into contact with extreme milieus. This can therefore be coincidences that determine whether one enters into far-right extremism, Islamist extremism or some other. It is therefore of interest that many of the same vulnerabilities are common to many far-right extremists and extreme Islamists.
Many actors have a role in preventing radicalization. This is therefore important with good inter-departmental prevention structures. The findings in this report show that many of the far-right extremists struggle with challenges tied to mental health, adjustment, unemployment and criminality. Therefore health care, schools/education, the NAV, the Correctional Services and the police are especially important actors within the work of prevention.
[i] Radicalization is defined here as a process whereby a person develops an acceptance for or willingness to carry out actively or participate in acts of violence in order to achieve political, ideological, or religious goal.
[ii] Extremism is defined here as acceptance of, active support for or participation in acts of violence in order to achieve political, ideological or religious goals.
[iii] Theme report: What backgrounds have people who frequent extreme Islamist milieus in Norway before they become radicalized? PST 2016.
[iv] An important reason why there are fewer people in the selection who became radicalized back in time, is that PST may delete people after 5 years (5-years rule) if no new information comes to light to show that the person supports/accepts violence to achieve a political/ideological goal (as per police registry regulations 22-3), and the criterion that the persons in the analysis must be an active far-right extremist today.
[v] Østfold, Akershus, Buskerud, Oppland, Hedmark, Vestfold, Telemark and Oslo.
[vi] Blom, Svein 2017: Attitudes to immigrants and immigration, Rapporter 2017/38, Statistics Norway.
[vii] 7% of the selection have unknown level of education.
[viii] Nationally the stats for highest completed level of education are as follows: 26% completed foundation school, 37% have completed secondary school and 33% have completed college/university (Norway Statistics, statistics on education). The figures show the level of education for people over 16 years. Norway Statistics does not adjust education statistics for age.
[ix] Blom, Svein 2017: Attitudes to immigrants and immigration, Rapporter 2017/38, Statistics Norway.
[x] In 2017, 66% of those in ages 15-74 years were employed (not adjusted for age) (Statistics Norway, 2017).
[xi] Directorate of Health, Work and mental health.
[xii] These are women and men in Norway 2018, Norway Statistics.
[xiii] Jensen, Ann-Magritt and Østby, Lars 2014: Steadily more men in Norway are childless, Samfunnsspeilet 2/2014.
[xiv] There are undoubtedly dark figures tied to this variable.
[xv] The proportion of extreme Islamists with mental disorders was 21%.
[xvi] It is assumed that 20% of the adult population will have a form of mental disorder within one year. The majority are anxiety and depressions. Mental disorders are more prevalent among young adults than among elders (Norwegian Institute of Public Health).
[xvii] One in five Norwegians feel lonely, and some 70000 have no close intimate friends they can turn to when they need someone to talk to (helsenorge.no). Further, there are around 63000 school-leavers who are regularly exposed to bullying. Children and young who are exposed to bullying have considerably elevated risk of suffering mental disorders (Norwegian Institute of Public Health).
[xviii] Here the distinction is not made between lawful and unlawful substances. Alcohol, doping pills and narcotics are treated here as substances.
[xix] Status convicted, suspected or charged in the criminal register.
[xx] Around 8% of men and 3% of women have an alcohol abuse disorder in Norway within 12 years. Alcohol abuse disorders are most widespread in ages 18-35 (Norwegian Institute of Public Health).
[xxi] The use of illicit substances is considerably lower than alcohol abuse disorders. Cannabis is the most used illicit substance. 20% of the population in ages 16-64 years have reported that they have used cannabis one or more times in life (Norwegian Institute of Public Health).
[xxii] Fangen, Kathrine 2001: A book on Neo-Nazis 2001, The University Press.
[xxiii] Bjørgo, Tore, Gjelsvik, Ingvild Magnæs 2015: Research on prevention of radicalization and violent extremism- A knowledge status, The Police College.
[xxiv] Status offended for cases of violence in the police's criminal case system.
[xxv] Less severe violence is defined here as common assault/battery. Grave violence is defined here as actual bodily harm/assault, murder attempted murder, and violence against police officer/public servant.
[xxvi] By physical activism is meant here that one is physically out and engages in far-right extremist activity. This can be demonstrations, distribution of propaganda, participation in far-right extremist social meetups etc.
[xxvii] Nesser, Petter, Lia, Brynjar, Stenersen, Anne and Ravndal, Jacob Aasland 2013: On radicalization and violent extremism on the Internet, in Sunde, Inger Marie 2013: Prevention of radicalization and violent extremism on the Internet, PHS Forskning.
[xxviii] Strømmen, Øyvind 2011: The black web. On far-right extremism, counter-jihadism and terror in Europe, Cappelen Damm.
[xxix] Haanshus, Birgitte and Jupskås, Anders Ravik 2017: Far-right click! An analysis of the fringe right on social media in Norway, The University Press.
[xxx] By radicalizer is meant here a person who attracts others into a radicalization process to extremism.